An Internet survey revealed that day-of-the-week (DOW) stereotypes (i.e., “Monday blues”, “Wednesday hump day”, “TGIF”, etc.) were pronounced when subjects predicted their moods for each day of the upcoming week, less obvious when they remembered their moods from each day of the preceding week, and least apparent in the momentary moods they actually experienced on each day. In a second study involving 2-hour, in-home interviews, subjects reporting looking forward to weekends because of the lack of structure and discipline and the (...) freedom to choose activities, yet much of their weekend time was spent fulfilling a need to be productive, which often involved activities that, in many ways, simulated paid work. The content of these interviews suggested that people tend to overvalue future discretionary time on the weekend, assuming that two days of uninterrupted idle time will be more enjoyable than it actually is. In a more general sense, these results suggest that the predicted and remembered moods in the initial survey were driven by DOW stereotypes, which facilitated rapid judgements given the simple scaled response format. However, the depth interviews revealed that moods experienced throughout the week are more nuanced in terms of how they are remembered, described, and linked to recently passed, current, and immediately anticipated events, perhaps explaining why DOW stereotypes were less obvious in the reported momentary moods. (shrink)

This book presents a thorough overview of a model of human functioning based on the idea that behavior is goal-directed and regulated by feedback control processes. It describes feedback processes and their application to behavior, considers goals and the idea that goals are organized hierarchically, examines affect as deriving from a different kind of feedback process, and analyzes how success expectancies influence whether people keep trying to attain goals or disengage. Later sections consider a series of emerging themes, including dynamic (...) systems as a model for shifting among goals, catastrophe theory as a model for persistence, and the question of whether behavior is controlled or instead 'emerges'. Three chapters consider the implications of these various ideas for understanding maladaptive behavior, and the closing chapter asks whether goals are a necessity of life. Throughout, theory is presented in the context of diverse issues that link the theory to other literatures. (shrink)

This book is concerned with `the problem of existence in mathematics'. It develops a mathematical system in which there are no existence assertions but only assertions of the constructibility of certain sorts of things. It explores the philosophical implications of such an approach through an examination of the writings of Field, Burgess, Maddy, Kitcher, and others.

A powerful challenge to some highly influential theories, this book offers a thorough critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that many possible worlds exist of which our own universe is just one. Chihara challenges this claim and offers a new argument for modality without worlds.

Compares and contrasts Philip Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics with the constructibility view of this work. Raises a variety of doubts about the cogency of Kitcher's account and points out several weaknesses in the account.

Penelope Maddy has attempted to develop a form of realism in mathematics that is not plagued by the sort of epistemological problems that beset traditional Platonism. Maddy advances the radical doctrine that we can and do causally interact with sets. We can see them, feel them, smell them, and even taste them. This chapter raises a series of objections to Maddy's version of realism.

Takes up Field's version of Logicism—a position that he calls ‘deflationism’. Unlike traditional Logicists, Field does not analyse mathematical propositions into purely logical ones, but he does analyse mathematical knowledge into logical knowledge. Several objections are raised to deflationism, revolving around Field's contention that mathematics consists mostly of falsehoods. Contends that, although mathematics, literally and platonically construed, is not true, it does convey genuine information.

Focuses on Hartry Field's Instrumentalism. The ‘Conservation Theorems’, upon which Field bases so much of his form of Instrumentalism, are examined in detail, as is Field's attempt to ‘nominalize’ physics. Doubts are raised about the adequacy of Field's views of mathematics and physics, and a detailed comparison with the Constructibility Theory is presented.

Since the constructibility quantifiers, used in the mathematical system to be developed, will all assert the constructibility of open sentences, an explanation is given of the kinds of open sentences that will be asserted to be constructible. Each of these open sentences will be assigned to a specific ‘level’, depending on the kind of objects or open sentences that can satisfy it, thus providing the basis for the Simple Type Theoretical characteristic of the system to be developed. The satisfaction relation (...) under discussion will be taken to be a primitive of the system. The relevance of Quine's objections to modality for this system is taken up. (shrink)

Concerns the ‘problem of existence’ in mathematics: the problem of how to understand existence assertions in mathematics. The problem can best be understood by considering how Mathematical Platonists have understood such existence assertions. These philosophers have taken the existential theorems of mathematics as literally asserting the existence of mathematical objects. They have then attempted to account for the epistemological and metaphysical implications of such a position by putting forward arguments that supposedly show how humans can come to know of the (...) existence of mathematical objects. The reasoning of the most prominent philosophers in this Literalist tradition, Quine and Gödel, are critically discussed. By way of contrast, an alternative position, Heyting's Intuitionism, is examined. (shrink)

Concerns an attempted refutation of nominalism put forward by John Burgess in the form of a dilemma argument. Argues that Burgess's argument is based upon a false dilemma.

The fundamentals of cardinality theory are laid out within the framework of the Constructibility Theory. Finite cardinality theory is developed along the lines described by Frege in his Foundations of Arithmetic, and applications of theory are discussed.

Briefly sketches a standard form of the development of analysis within the Constructibility Theory. Then develops an axiomatized theory of lengths, in terms of which a system of rational and real numbers is specified. These developments are used to provide the basis for a theory of functions of real and complex variables.

The first of six chapters in which rival views are critically evaluated and compared with the Constructibility view described in earlier chapters. The views considered here are those of Stewart Shapiro and Michael Resnik. A number of difficulties with these two views are detailed and it is explained how the Constructibility Theory is not troubled by the problems that Structuralism was explicitly developed to resolve.

Sketches the basic idea for the approach taken. A mathematical system is to be developed in which the existential theorems of traditional mathematics are to be replaced by constructibility theorems: where, in traditional mathematics, it is asserted that such and such exists, it will be asserted in this system that something or other can be constructed. Thus, constructibility quantifiers are introduced in this chapter as logical constants of formal systems. The logic of the constructibility quantifier is explained in each case (...) via possible worlds semantics, which is used as a didactic or heuristic device. (shrink)

The promised mathematical system—the Constructibility Theory—is presented as an axiomatized deductive theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order logical language. The axioms of the theory are specified and a justification for each of the axioms is given. Objections to the theory are considered.

This paper explores some lines of argument in wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, On the one hand, And his philosophy of language, His epistemology, And his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other. The authors maintain that the later writings of wittgenstein express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism." they also maintain (...) that there are good grounds for rejecting the philosophical theory implicit in wittgenstein's later works. In particular, They first argue that wittgenstein's position leads to some implausible conclusions concerning the nature of language and psychology; second, They maintain that the arguments wittgenstein provides are inconclusive; and third, They sketch an alternative position which they believe avoids many of the difficulties implicit in wittgenstein's philosophy. (shrink)

v. 1-2. Principles of philosophy and Elements of logic.--v. 3-4. Exact logic (published papers) and The simplest mathematics.--v. 5-6. Pragmatism and pragmaticism and Scientific metaphysics.--v. 7. Science and philosophy.--v. 8. Reviews, correspondence and bibliography.

Arranged and integrated to reveal epistemology, phenomenology, theory of signs, other major topics.

Explores how continental philosophy can inform environmental ethics.

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the (...) seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self-select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy. (shrink)

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the (...) seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self-select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy. (shrink)